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Abstract 
 
European Union Antitrust Laws have been successfully applied to anti-competitive behaviour, 
which can take place abroad, but have an effect within the EU. Under Antitrust Laws, not only abuse of 
dominant position practices but also mergers that restrain competition are regarded as illegal and subject 
to severe remedies. 
This paper accesses both Microsoft-WMP and Volvo-Scania cases in the light of the EU 
Competition Policy and identifies the circumstances involved, final decisions made as well as the 
suggested remedies and the consequences from the consumers’ perspective. The issues considered are per 
se controversial and these are clear examples of the long path to go through, in order to make the 
competition law regime uniformly applicable in all member states. 
 The lack of international consensus on competition law and enforcement requires huge efforts in 
co-operation between countries and organisations, because in combination with economic liberalisation, 
nations have come to recognise competition as a powerful instrument for stimulating innovation and 
economic growth. This paper focus on the past, i.e., already assessed anticompetitive cases; the present - 
the current EU Competition Policy rules - and finally on the future of Antitrust jurisdiction, in which part 
I will briefly describe the major actual concerns in the long course towards a common and 
homogeneously valid system of International Competition Policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The wealth of a nation consists of all goods that fulfil the consumer’s wants, therefore increasing 
wealth means expanding the quantity, quality and variety of consumer goods. The idea of a free and 
decentralized market with a socially optimal allocation has been alive among economists, since the time 
of Adam Smith’s “indivisible hand”. However, we must notice that real market conditions are 
characterized by market structures between perfect competition and monopoly.  Hence, conditions 
dominated by imperfect competition, asymmetric information or external effects make competitive 
equilibria socially inefficient – typical in nowadays industries in the new economy. 
The problem is that the above analysis is a static one vis-à-vis dynamic models that take into 
account that efforts to become a monopoly and enjoy high prices are the engine of the competitive 
innovation process, although such efforts might be wasteful. Monopoly profits are also an important 
signalling tool that stimulates competition, as the higher the monopolist price, the higher the incentive of 
rival firms to take part in these profits by undercutting the monopolist. Thus, economic theory has shown 
that monopoly pricing is not always inefficient, and that is why I will analyse/model the Microsoft-WMP 
case as an example of a controversial issue among economists. 
Monopoly pricing is a de facto major concern of antitrust: if firms seek to raise their profits 
through merger, they must attain governmental/EU approval; when a firm abuses of its dominant position 
by performing anti-competitive strategies, such actions are not only unenforceable, but also subject to 
criminal charges in EU jurisdiction. For the past years, the Commission has focused primarily on 
facilitating market entry rather than on regulating “unfair” prices per se (emphasis in thus shifting from 
“fair” competition into free competition). Monopoly pricing regulation is thus a microcosm of 
competition policy.2 Market power is the main concern of the international antitrust policy. 3 From a 
public policy point of view, market power has negative and positive implications, which often makes 
antitrust policy ambiguous if not paradoxical. The negative implications of market power are, inter alia: 
wealth transfer from the consumers to the firm; loss in efficiency; and rent-seeking.4 The most positive 
implication is the incentive to innovate, thus it leads to dynamic efficiency (i.e. technological progress) 
with respect to certain goods. It follows that increasing market power is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of every (core) antitrust offence. There is no question that competition is an issue of primary 
importance in open market economy – it leads to price reduction, innovation, better efficiency and wider 
choice for consumers. The definition of the relevant market is, ab initio, one of the most important, if not 
the decisive, problem concerning antitrust law5.  
The proposed merger between Volvo and Scania was notified to the European Commission on 22 
September 1999 6. A Commission Decision on 15 March 2000 declared the merger incompatible with the 
Common Market and the functioning of the EEA, based on the definition of the relevant market, inter 
alia. In March 2004, the EC held that Microsoft used its Windows OS to unfairly leverage its “overly 
                                                 
2 See Michal S. Gal, Monopoly pricing as an antitrust offence in the US and EC: Two systems of belief about monopoly?, forthcoming, 
Antitrust Bulletin (summer 2004). 
3 See Dabbah, Maher M., The Internationalization of Antitrust Policy, Cambridge University Press, UK, First published 2003, p. 46-58. 
4 See Overgaard, Baltzer, Notes on antitrust policy and regulation in the EU and beyond, University of Aarhus, May 26, 2003. 
5 See Baker, Donald I., Market Definition in Transnational Joint-Ventures, Mergers and Monopolization, p. 118. 
6 See Case No COMP/M. 1672 European Commission. 
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dominant position”7 in the PC operating systems market. By tying WMP to its OS, the EC said the 
company is unfairly harming its competitors’ products. The imposed remedy required Microsoft offer its 
Windows OS without WMP and also to disclose its proprietary technical information so rivals can build 
products that are compatible with Microsoft’s OS. And, finally, the EC imposed its largest fine ever—
over EUR 497 million. 
 
2. A General Overview of the EU Competition Policy8 
 The aim of EU competition policy is, per definitionem, to promote competition and create a 
single market, which goes beyond national borders as well as to promote the process of economic 
integration9. Competition policy is a mean to ensure wider consumer choice, technological innovation and 
effective price competition. There are four pillars of EU competition policy: antitrust & cartels, market 
liberalization, state aid control, and abuse of dominance and merger control10. Due to the cases analysed 
in this paper I will refer only to the first and fourth points. 
 Anticompetitive practices are per definitionem strategies intentionally designed to limit the 
degree of competition inside a market. Such actions can be taken by one firm in isolation or a number of 
firms engaged in explicit or implicit collusion. Examples of anticompetitive practices are, inter alia: 
predatory pricing, vertical restraint in the market, creation of artificial barriers to entry, and collusive 
practices.11 Practices are not prohibited if the respective agreements “contribute to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical progress in the market”.12 In a free and 
decentralized market, business is a competitive game. Sometimes, companies may be tempted to avoid 
competing with each other and try to set their own rules of the game. The European Commission, per se, 
acts as the referee to ensure that all companies play by the same rules.13 
 
2.1 Anti-Trust Policy - Abuses of a Dominant Market Position 
Antitrust is the study of competition. It is a bundle of laws that seek to ensure competitive 
markets through the interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange. Antitrust law is 
centered on a primary principle that society is better off if markets behave competitively. Figure 1 present 
number of new antitrust cases opened in years 1993-2002. Even if counting only newly opened cases, it is 
clearly visible that the DG Competition of European Commission has to engage massive work. 
A firm holds a dominant position if its economic power enables it to operate within the market 
without taking account of the reaction of its competitors or of intermediate or final consumers. Holding a 
dominant position is not wrong in itself if it is the result of the firm's own effectiveness and 
competitiveness against other businesses. But if the firm exploits this power to stifle competition, this is 
deemed to be an anti-competitive practice which constitutes abuse. A good recent example of this was the 
                                                 
7 See Case No COMP/C-3/37.792 European Commission. 
8 See Commission: DG-Competition: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html. 
9 See Jonczek, Joanna, Competitive Market – Antitrust dimension of competition policy in the EU, YouRec Conference Paper, February 2004. 
10 EC Treaty stipulates only that abusing dominant positions is prohibited. However, in order to prevent the situation when dominant 
position is achieved through mergers and acquisitions, the Merger Regulation had been adopted; see: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings and amendments. 
11 See generally Goyder, D G, EC Competition Law, Oxford European Community Law Series, Clarendon Press. 
12 See Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
13 See Dabbah, Maher M., The Internationalization of Antitrust Policy, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, First published 2003, p. 
86-95. 
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investigation by the EU Commission into the alleged abuse of market power by Microsoft. Microsoft was 
accused by the Commission of continuing to abuse its monopoly in the software market. The investigators 
alleged that Microsoft bundled Media Player with Windows, unfairly damaging rival programs such as 
Real Networks’ RealPlayer and Apple Computer’s QuickTime. 
 
2.2 European Merger Policy (Figure 2) 
The main issue about these cases is whether a proposed merger or takeover is thought to lead to 
a substantial lessening of competitive environment in the market and risks leading to a level of market 
concentration  (calculations theoretically based on Lerner and Bain Indexes) when collusive behaviour 
might become a reality. 
Often a merger is allowed to progress without any intervention by the competition authorities 
when the economic benefits of allowing the integration to take place are significantly greater than the 
potential costs. Here are some of the main justifications for approving a merger between two businesses: 
efficiency arguments14, the role of the capital markets, market contestability arguments, the capital 
investment argument, the globalization argument, and mergers as a means of enhancing economic 
integration within the EU. As counter-arguments we have: monopoly power, mixed evidence on benefits 
of mergers, imperfections in capital markets, and employment effects. 
 
3. The Internationalization of Antitrust Policy – A Global Competition Policy and the Challenges 
ahead 
The internationalization of antitrust policy is a topic of great contemporary significance and 
debate. With increasing globalisation of trade15, more and more companies, mergers and cartels are 
international. Consequently, the activities of companies based outside the EU may affect competition 
within the EEA. This has made international cooperation on competition policy essential.16 Any company 
whose activities affect the EU market is subject to European competition law. (e.g. the European 
Commission can intervene where a merger affects competition in the EU, whether or not the merging 
companies are based within the EU). 
Nowadays, almost all national authorities are members of forums such as the ICN, which is an 
informal, worldwide network of competition authorities. International business community leaders should 
take immediate responsibility to take action and reform, given the serious and increasing marketplace 
costs imposed by multiple and divergent antitrust regimes17. Strong competition and consumer protection 
policy is crucial to maintaining a marketplace that benefits consumers and that position EU firms to 
compete fiercely abroad. 
                                                 
14 See Walters, Stephen J. K., Enterprise, Government and the public, McGraw Hill, Inc, 1993, p.39. 
15 See generally Schaub, Alexander, International Co-operation in Antitrust Matters: Making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD 
Proceedings, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Feb. 1998  (No. 1), at 2, available at http://europa.eu.int 
16 See Wakil, Omar K. et al., Antitrust Report: Canada and the European Union enter into a new era of antitrust enforcement cooperation, 
Lexis Publishing, February 2000.  
17 See James, Charles A., International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence, US Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division, 2001. 
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Regarding cooperation in this domain we can have bilateral agreements, as well as multilateral 
contact.18  Multilateral discussions between enforcement agencies occur on a number of fronts, primarily 
under the auspices of the OECD19 and WTO, although other agencies, such as UNCTAD, also play a vital 
role. 
The major obstacles existing in Member State laws: absence of transparent statutory basis for 
bringing EC competition law based damages actions; lack of designation of limited number of specialized 
competition courts; lack of binding effect on national courts of cartel authorities decisions; uncertainties 
as to calculation of damages; no punitive damages accepted - lengthy proceedings – costs and fees not 
entirely recoverable in practice; no contingency fees admitted. Suggestions to assist private enforcement: 
develop access to courts; decrease legal uncertainties; improve degree of expertise by restricting number 
of competent courts; facilitate proof of elements of liability; reduce financial costs and length of 
proceedings; improve remedies’ information.20  
Thus, in the presence of international trade, competition policies implemented on a national level 
will mean that countries impose substantial external effects on each other. As a result, increased 
international economic integration enhances the benefits from international coordination of competition 
policies. A number of problems arise form centralizing competition policy to a supranational institution 
like the European Commission, as exemplified by the recent blocked merger plan between the two 
Swedish motor-vehicle makers, Volvo and Scania. 
The Volvo-Scania case brought the question of whether small countries, like the Nordic ones, 
are at a disadvantage21 if the Commission’s definition of market dominance automatically refers to fairly 
small and segmented national markets rather than to the European market in a larger sense. This in turn, 
leads to the small countries concern of losing even more capital and investment to larger and more 
competitive countries.22 Reasonable merger analyses often imply that the definition of national markets 
often coincide with national borders. Hence, firms in small countries face tighter merger restrictions 
because they will quickly reach critical market shares, even though they might, in a global perspective, 
still be relatively small in absolute size. Proponents of this argument advocate that it is beneficial for 
small countries to allow mergers that potentially harm domestic consumers, because such mergers have 
the advantage of making domestic companies large enough to capture rents on imperfectly competitive 
international markets. Namely, because firms in small countries can engage in cross-border mergers these 
firms can acquire international competitiveness without sacrificing domestic consumer interests.  
 
 
                                                 
18 On September 23, 1991, the EC signed a bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement with the US, and on April 10, 1995, the European 
Commission and Council adopted a joint decision approving the 1991 EU-US agreement and declaring it applicable from then onwards. 
19 See Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning Cooperation between member countries on Anticompetitive practices 
affecting international trade, OECD document No C(95)130/Final (Sept. 21, 1995). 
20 See Gerven, Walter van, Private enforcement of EC competition rules (provisional background paper), Joint EU Commission/IBA 
Conference on antitrust reform in Europe: a year in practice, Brussels, 10-11 March 2005 
21 See Fran Riksdag & Departement, Nr 30, 2001 Almeberg, R, Monti, Foretagen och Konkurrensen, p.3. 
22 See Svenska Dagbladet, Ledare, Kommissionen Kvaddar Fusionen, 15.03.2000, p. 2. 
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4. The Volvo - Scania Case23 
 4.1 Introduction 
In 1999, AB Volvo, a Swedish industry, underwent a complete restructuring. Volvo’s car 
production, representing approximately half of the company’s entire business, was sold off to the Ford 
Motor Co. of Detroit. Volvo’s decision to sell the automobile division reflected its determination to 
concentrate on its trucks, buses and engines businesses. Thus, Volvo subsequently ventured onto the 
market, acquiring a large shareholding of Scania AB, its main Swedish competitor in the production and 
marketing of trucks and buses.  
On August 6, 1999 AB Volvo reached an agreement with Investor AB, the then main holder of 
the shares in Scania AB, to acquire the control of Scania. Having in mind the EC Merger Regulation 
(Figure 3), Volvo notified the Commission of the plans to acquire Scania. Following the first stage 
investigation, which gave rise to serious concerns whether the merger was compatible with the rules and 
regulations of the Common Market, the Commission decided to institute the so-called “Phase 2” 
procedure, according to Article 6(1)(c)24 of the Merger Regulation. The investigation resulted in a 
Commission Decision prohibiting the proposed acquisition as incompatible with the Common Market 
pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Merger Regulation (14 March 2000).25 The decisive factor influencing the 
Commission’s decision was, the determination of the relevant product and geographic market.26(Figure 4) 
Volvo and Scania were relatively equal in terms of market share of the truck and bus markets, and had 
been the main competitors on the Nordic market for a while, building up their strong positions in the 
home market. Other manufacturers of trucks and buses were small compared to Volvo and Scania on the 
Nordic markets (particularly on the Swedish one). Both Volvo and Scania had created their distinctive 
images in heavy and technologically advanced vehicles and were primarily active in the top, most 
expensive segments of the markets of trucks and buses. The merger between Volvo and Scania would 
have made the company the largest truck company in Europe (Figure 5). 
 
4.2 Market definition 
The analysis of the relevant product market is simple. The truck market is classified in three 
categories: light duty trucks (less than 6 tons), medium duty trucks (5-16 tons) and heavy duty trucks 
(more than 16 tons).27 The heavy truck market is then subdivided into two segments: Rigid trucks and 
tractor trucks (Figure 6). While it is known that rigids and tractors may not be fully substitutable, the final 
conclusion is that the category of heavy trucks constitutes the single relevant market. Light and medium 
duty trucks are thus not included.  
The analysis of the relevant geographic market is more detailed28. As stated above, the failure of 
Volvo’s notification was largely due to the Commission’s restricted definition of the relevant geographic 
                                                 
23 Case No COMP/M.1672 –Volvo/Scania Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 Merger Procedure Article 8(3) Date: 15/03/2000 
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ mergers/cases/decisions/m1672_en.pdf 
24 Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings. 
25 See Hemmingsson, Elisabeth, The Volvo/Scania Merger: An Analysis of the EC Merger Process, Gothenburg School of Economics and 
Commercial Law-Faculty of Law, Masters Thesis in Law, Spring 2002-06-21 
http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/00003259/01/200262.pdf 
26 See Monti, M, Market Definition as a Cornerstone of EU Competition Policy, Speech/01/439, 5 October 2001 
27 OJ, L143, 29/05/2001 P. 0074 – 0132, The Commission Decision, Case No COMP/M. 1672 Volvo/Scania, at paras 13-15 
28  See Hemmingsson, Elisabeth, The Volvo/Scania Merger: An Analysis of the EC Merger Process, Gothenburg School of Economics and 
Commercial Law-Faculty of Law, Masters Thesis in Law, Spring 2002-06-21, p.39-40, 42-47. 
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market as the national market of each of the Nordic countries, Ireland and the UK (different from Volvo 
and Sweden’s contention that the relevant geographic market was EEA-wide). While, the new Volvo-
Scania’s share of the western European market would have been around 30%, its share of the market of 
the Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, was estimated at an average of 2/3 and 90%, respectively 
(Figure 7 and 8). In its notification, Volvo relied on a series of non-price factors meant to support the 
argument that the relevant geographic market was EEA-wide, namely (a) the emergence of large, private, 
trans-border purchasers, who have knowledge of prices and competitive conditions in other Member 
States when negotiating with distributors of trucks; (b) the emergence of dual sourcing, which ensures 
independence of customers from any single manufacturer; (c) product standardization, which resulted in 
the fact that the same basic truck can be sold and used throughout Europe; and (d) the absence of entry 
barriers for nondomestic producers. However, the Commission counterbalanced the above arguments, 
with the following: First, there are substantial price and markup differences across countries – different 
price-elasticities of demand  (Figure 9). Second, the models and technical configurations differ 
considerably, because of local consumer preferences and national technical requirements. Third, the 
selective and exclusive distribution system links the sales and after-sales services. The importance of 
profits from after-sales service may therefore induce dealers to charge higher prices to foreign customers. 
Finally, there are large variations in market shares across countries. 
 
4.3 Assessment 
The Commission Decision explicitly describes its methodology for assessing the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position (ex-officio). According to Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, a 
concentration that creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition 
would be impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it, shall be declared incompatible 
with the Common Market. It used traditional market power variables, i.e., market shares, supplemented 
by qualitative factors such as customer purchasing power and the likelihood of entry. The investigation is 
limited to the five countries where the creation of a dominant is found (Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Ireland), or where this is found to be likely (Denmark). For each of the five countries analyzed, the 
Commission took the market shares as the starting point of the assessment. Figure 7 gathers the market 
shares of the seven truck manufacturers. The table shows that the joint market share of Volvo and Scania 
is the largest in precisely the five countries where dominance is found (in the 49-91 percentile). This 
reveals that the Decision attached a high weight to the merging firms’ joint market share in assessing 
dominance. In its market share analysis the Commission also underlined that the merging firms’ joint 
market share had remained stable, and showed no tendency to decline. Finally, the Commission pointed 
out the large difference between the joint market share of the merging parties and the market share of the 
largest remaining competitor in most of the five countries.  
The Commission supplemented its market share analysis with qualitative factors. First, the 
extent of brand loyalty and the customer structure was considered (the Commission found indicators of 
considerable brand loyalty and of a dispersed customer structure). The Commission concluded that there 
was little customer purchasing power to compensate for the increased market power by the merging 
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firms. Second, the possibility of entry was studied. The Commission claimed that competing undertakings 
faced substantial barriers of entry into the relevant markets, especially in Sweden, inter alia, due to the 
following: (a) the Nordic markets were small and sparsely populated; (b) the existence in Sweden by 
legislation of the special “cab crash test”, a crash safety test for truck-driver seats functioning as a 
technical barrier to trade and (c) the need to establish a high service network level. With all these 
conditions, the Commission found that it was highly improbable that sufficiently effective competition 
would remain in the examined countries after the merger of Volvo and Scania, even though some 
efficiency reasons presented by Volvo. (Figure 10) 
 
4.4 Remedies 
The commitments involved, inter alia, allowing car dealers and servicing companies full 
freedom to sell and service competing makes, that Volvo during a two year period would refrain from 
selling heavy trucks under the brand name of Scania and that certain of Scania’s bus production units 
would be sold off.  
Moreover, both parties must not only reduce their collective market power, but also restore 
conditions for effective competition, which would be distorted as a result of the merger. Probably, the 
Commission would have accepted divestiture, which is the most preferred remedy in merger cases. News 
reports indicated that divestiture of Scania’s bus operations and elimination of the Scania truck brand in 
Ireland and the Nordic states were among remedies suggested by the Commission to the parties, however, 
not accepted by the latter.  
 
4 .5 Conclusion 
In view of the above, the Commission has come to the conclusion that the notified concentration 
was incompatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, since, it would 
create dominant positions in certain the markets, which would result in competition being significantly 
impeded in the common market within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation and Article 
57 of the EEA Agreement.29 
The Volvo/Scania Decision illustrates what a decisive impact of the relevant the market 
definition has in competition cases such as this30. On this point, the concentration would have resembled a 
monopoly situation. Nordic customers would have been the most affected by an increase in prices linked 
to absence of competitive pressure, since they had been paying even more prior to the merger (Figure 11). 
One could consider three ways in which horizontal mergers might create or strengthen a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded: a merger may create 
or strengthen a dominant position of the only large firm in an industry (“a firm with a paramount market 
position”); a merger may diminish the degree of competition in a concentrated market by eliminating 
important competitive constraints (“non-collusive oligopolies”); and a merger may create or reinforce a 
situation where competition is reduced by co-ordination (“increased risk of co-ordination”).(Figure 12)  
                                                 
29 Commission of the European Communities Press Release – 14 March 2000, Press Release Regarding Commission Prohibition of 
Volvo/Scania Concentration, Document No: EUK9732852 
30 See Handler, M., Antitrust in Transition, Volume 2, Transnational Juris Publications Inc. Ardsley-on-Hudson, New York, p.639. 
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 The specific case in hands comprises the three situations in case the merger would have been 
allowed to happen. In that case consumers would be worse off, as one can show with a “welfare analysis” 
according to different countries (Figure 13). It is easy to see that the largest fall in consumer surplus and 
largest increase in industry profit occurs in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland). When 
looking at the change in welfare it is worth noticing that only negative sings appear in the presented table. 
Now suppose that the merger would imply some kind of “cost efficiencies” (Figure 14). Even though, 
one could see that whatever the percentage of cost efficiency chosen, in the Nordic countries consumers 
would be always worse off as their loss in surplus would outweigh the profit gain by producers (Volvo-
Scania). The overall conclusion is, then, a welfare reduction for society in the case of merger.  
 
 
5. The Microsoft – WMP Case31 
5.1 Introduction 
In 2004, the European Commission fined Microsoft EUR 497 million for abusing its dominant 
position in the market for OS for PCs between 1998 and 2004. 32 The European had found that Microsoft 
broke the European Union competition law and after a five-year investigation the EC concluded that 
Microsoft had carried out illegal practices “by leveraging its near monopoly in the market for PC OS onto 
the markets for […] for media players”.33 
 
5.2 EU accusation arguments 
The commission's case against Microsoft is detailed in a document, known as the “Statement of 
Objections”. The document, accused Microsoft of behaving anti-competitively in two areas. First, the 
commission alleged that Microsoft was trying to extend its desktop monopoly34 into the market for 
workgroup servers by keeping secret the communications protocols that enable its desktop and server 
products communicate (rivals could not compete fairly in the market).35 Secondly, Microsoft was accused 
of trying to extend its monopoly into the media-player market, by bundling its WMP software into 
Windows36. Rival products, did not have this advantage; nor could WMP be uninstalled. This had the 
effect of populating all PCs with Windows media player and distorting competition by driving content 
providers and applications developers to the Windows media platform. “The result is a weakening of 
effective competition in the market...and less innovation,” it concluded.37 This innovation problem does 
not lay with Microsoft but with capitalism. Both the US case and the EC ruling reveal that Microsoft has 
played a significant role in retarding the development of technological innovations that threaten its 
                                                 
31 See Ayres, Ian & Nalebuff, Barry, Going soft on Microsoft? The EU´s Antitrust case and remedy, The Economist’s Voice, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 
Art.4, 2005. 
32 The full decision is available at “Commission Decision”: www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf. 
See para 543. 
33 Ibidem paras 473-514, 541, 779. 
34 See John R. Wilke, John R. & Mitchener, Brandon, A Global Journal Report: Microsoft Rivals Allege Antitrust In New EU Case — Group 
Opens Added Front, Challenging Software Giant Over Windows XP System, Wall St. J., Feb. 11,2003, at A.1.http://www.global-trade-
law.com/Article.Antitrust%20(Microsoft%20&%20EU)%20(WSJ%202.11.03).htm. 
35 See “Commission Decision” supra note 32 at para 779. 
36 See supra note 32.  
37 See “Commission Decision” supra note 32 at para 700. 
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dominance. A 90% market share means that applications released by Microsoft become the de facto 
standard, regardless they are the best tools. (Figure 15) 
The argument that the efficiencies derived from incorporating WMP into Windows prevail over 
the anti-competitive effects was dismissed. The commission observed that the incorporation of WMP in 
Windows “sends signals which deter innovation”. It used new evidence from updated market shares to 
illustrate how Microsoft's server and media-player had advanced at the expense of rivals. But it did 
confirm that Microsoft was exploiting its desktop dominance in workgroup server software; and that, by 
“tying” WMP to Windows, it had overtaken its chief rival in the media-player market, RealNetworks38. 
(Figure 16) A difficult aspect of the law is that Article 82 places emphasis on the protection of 
competition that already exists, rather than on pursuing the introduction of new.  
 
5.3 Remedies 
The simplest one was a fine that reflected the “gravity and duration” of the infringement. 
European antitrust law allows violators to be fined as much as 10% of their annual worldwide revenues. 
In addition, Microsoft would be required to license its server-communications protocols to rivals on a 
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” basis.39 Other, Microsoft should provide information to competitors 
to allow them to interface with its servers40.  More controversial was the remedy proposed by the 
commission to address the tying of WMP to Windows. It suggested two alternatives: one forcing 
Microsoft to “untie” the two products and produce a version of Windows without WMP41; the other a 
“must-carry” approach, which would require Microsoft to include its leading rivals' media-player 
software with every copy of Windows. 
The company argued that support for the playing of audio and video was part of the core 
functionality of Windows. Furthermore, it pointed out that PC-makers were, entitled to install media 
players made by other firms together with WMP. Microsoft said that forcing Microsoft to produce a 
Europe-specific version of Windows without WMP would, in fact, impose an inferior product on 
European consumers.42 It was hard to discuss that this would be in their interests. Finally an agreement on 
versions of Windows without a media player took place. A Microsoft press release reported that the 
company has agreed to adopt the names "Windows XP Home Edition N" and "Windows XP Professional 
Edition N" for the versions of Windows it must offer without a media player.  
 
5.4 Tying: the important issue about the EU Commision VS Microsoft Case 
The Commission presents four conditions that have to be satisfied for tying to be prohibited 
under Article 82.43 The first condition is that the tied good and the tying good are separate products; the 
remaining conditions require dominance in the tied good; that no untied supply is available; and that tying 
forecloses competition.  
                                                 
38 Ellis Booker, RealNetworks Exec to Senate: Microsoft Breaks our Software, Internetweek.com, (1998): 
www.internetwk.com/news/news0723-9.htm. 
39 See “Commission Decision” supra note 32 at para 1003. 
40 Nicholas Kulish, Nine States Argue That Microsoft Still Illegally Thwarts Competition, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at B.3. 
41 See “commission Decision” supra note 32 at para 1011. 
42 Ibidem para 637, Microsoft it self has used the argument of interoperability when it sells its products as a superior alternative to 
competition. See ibidem para 638 et sequentia. 
43 Ibidem para 982. 
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Concentrating on the first condition, there is an immediate problem of definition. As frequently 
mentioned by economists, all products can be thought of as "bundles" of individual components. The 
Commission argues that whether the tied and tying products are distinct depends on whether there exists 
"independent demand" for the tied product. Its argument that the tying of WMP to Windows meets the 
first condition for its abusive tying test then seems to rest on the observation that separate media players 
are available, and that there is clearly consumer demand for these players. Since the Commission has 
established that Microsoft is dominant in the tied product, and since no untied version of Windows was 
available, its test of abuse tries to evaluate to whether tying diminishes competition in the market for the 
supply of media players.44  
Another way to address the problem of when tying should be interpreted as an abuse of a 
dominant position is to abandon the concept of "tying" altogether. In the Microsoft case  "tying" can be 
re-interpreted as potential refusal to supply cases. Some argue that the use of a dominant position to 
achieve benefits in supplying a related market, which would not be obtainable without that dominant 
position, could be defined to contradict a concept of competition on the merits. In fact, the Commission's 
analysis is more convincing as its focuses on whether Microsoft's tying practice threatens the existence of 
rivalry between different media players, without being sidetracked by whether Microsoft's practices allow 
"competition on the merits".45 
It is not clear what the difference is between a firm that is "overwhelmingly dominant", as 
Microsoft was found to be in market for client PC operating systems, and a firm that is just dominant. The 
Commission's terminology highlights a paradox of market definition and dominance analysis. 
"Overwhelmingly dominant" could mean that the Commission considers Microsoft to be almost certainly 
dominant in the supply of client PC operating systems. In contrast, a competition authority finds a firm 
"dominant" when it has a market share of a little over 40 per cent, then this could mean that there is a 
sufficient risk that the firm is dominant, and therefore that it is appropriate to apply the obligations of 
Article 82 of EC competition law to that firm.  Even with such an interpretation, it remains doubtful that 
"overwhelmingly dominant" is a useful addition to the vocabulary of competition policy. 
 
5.5 The everlasting problem: Monopoly and Microsoft 
Monopoly is the unavoidable outcome of the evolution of capitalist economy. (Figure 17) Not 
only in computer technology, but also in every major industry, the process of capitalist accumulation 
leads to the big capital firms driving small capital out of the market, with one or several companies 
eventually becoming dominant. Microsoft is the product of a social system and if Microsoft is a 
monopolist in this traditional economic sense, then it must be restricting its output and raising price. 
Contrarily, Microsoft seems to be selling too many of its products, sometimes giving them out for free.  
Traditional economic theories cannot explain Microsoft behaviours and their effects on 
competition and market efficiency. In the digital marketplace, the fact that there is one dominant firm 
does not imply that the firm has monopoly market power or that the market is inefficient. Three 
                                                 
44 AAI column for FTC: WATCH 3/04 Microsoft and the Media Player Market: There’s an American Story, too, Norman Hawker, Western 
Michigan Universirty: www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/304.pdf. 
45 See “Commission Decision” supra note 32 at para 1027. 
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arguments, to defend Microsoft's position as the dominant player in the computer industry, are: (1) 
Microsoft may have no monopoly power even when it is a de facto monopolist; (2) an efficient software 
market may support only one firm due to scale economies and the digital product's falling marginal cost; 
(3) network externalities in software tend to favour one firm over the others.46  
Firstly, Microsoft still faces fierce competition from Apple's Mac OS, IBM's OS and UNIX-
based OS, despite its dominance - roughly 90% of OS for desktop computers. Consequently, Microsoft is 
expanding its output, and its success does not have the problem associated with the monopoly. Unlike the 
firm in Figure 17, Microsoft's market behaviours do not exhibit any sign of either restricting output or 
raising price.  
Secondly, unlike the firm with increasing marginal cost (depicted in Figure 17), computer 
software generally has a decreasing marginal or average cost because of its high fixed developing 
software cost and extremely low duplicating (variable) cost, resulting in the typical U-shaped average cost 
curve. For many digital products, their costs seem to be dominated by the increasing return in all output 
levels, a pattern observed in many natural monopolies. An efficient market result in such a case is to 
allow one firm to produce all necessary output in order to achieve the maximum economy of scale47. 
(Figure 18) Therefore, Microsoft's dominance in OS software is an efficient result due to the 
characteristics of the software industry.  When a product has decreasing average cost or an increasing 
economy of scale, a competitive market often fails to achieve an efficient solution (no firms will produce 
the product). Therefore, Microsoft's dominance in the OS market may well be efficient.  
Increasing returns, network effects, and the interoperability together seem to produce a 
monopolized but efficient market. All of these concepts indicate some sort of incentives that drive the 
market toward a single dominant product whereby consumers benefit from its dominance. With network 
externality, the value of a product goes up as more people have the same product. Microsoft's dominance 
is simply a manifestation of the network externality which relentlessly drives computer software to 
standardization.  A network externality is an externality related to the number of users for a group of 
products.(Figure 19) However, an externality is no longer an externality if a market price already reflects 
the price of an external benefit or loss. For example, a computer operating system may have a positive 
externality in that its value increases as there are more people using the same product. This can be 
represented by an upward sloping benefit schedule for consumers48. Unlike other public goods, software 
manufacturers can and do raise their prices for that purpose. In this sense, the network externality is fully 
absorbed by the market price, and as a result there is no externality problem.49 We can certainly attribute 
Microsoft's dominance in OS to network effects.  
Computer related technologies have today such big social significance that they cannot be left in 
the hands of businessmen. What shall happen is the transformation of capitalist monopolies into public 
utilities, operated under the democratic control of the working class. However, we know that competition 
                                                 
46 Katz, M.L. and C. Shapiro, 1985. "Network externalities, competition, and compatibility." American Economic Review, 75(3): 424-440.  
47 Arther, W.B., Increasing returns and the new world of business, Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1996, pp. 100-109.  
48 Liebowitz, S.J. and S. E. Margolis, 1995. "Are network externalities a new source of market failure?" Research in Law and Economics, 
17:1-22.  
49 Chou, C.-F. and O. Shy, 1990. Network effects without network externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8: 259-
270.  
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is not a quantity; it is a process by which entrepreneurs forecast and discover the preferences of 
consumers. Microsoft proved to be very good in such task, and punishing the company for its own 
success does not just weaken a free economy; it is clearly immoral. 
 
5.6 The model Windows - WMP50 
Consider a market with one producer of software (Microsoft), selling to heterogeneous software 
users who only differ with respect to how much they value the existence of the software WMP. There are 
2η  potential WMP users who are divided in two groups: those who value WMP program and those who 
do not need it or use it, even if they have the all package of Windows software (with WMP included) 
because they prefer alternative softwares like RealNetworks, Apple’s Mac, etc.. 51 Thus the potential 
consumers are composed of η  (type WMP) users who value WMP, and η  (type O52) who value other 
softwares and not WMP. 
Each consumer buys at most one Windows. Thus, denoting by 0≥q  the quantity sold by 
Microsoft, q also stand for the actual number of WMP buyers. The utility function of each consumer type 
is given by (eq. 5.1)53 
 
 
 
  
   
               
            
 
 
 
 where 0>β  is the “basic” utility each consumer gets from buying a Windows package regardless of 
having WMP pre-installed. The parameter α (multiplying the total number of WMP buyers, q) measures 
the degree of importance WMP has to type WMP users. Hence, the product qα is the total utility gain 
from having a Complete Windows Version that benefits from all WMP features/options, the range of 
windows media format available and network effects. Finally, in my analysis I ignore sunk and fixed 
costs that are associated with the development and installation of the WMP software. Instead, I will focus 
on unit production cost of installing WMP in one package of Windows and not installing in others54. I 
therefore denote by WMPµ  the unit of a Windows version with the WMP included. I also denote by Oµ  
the unit cost of a Windows version with no WMP in. Then, I assume that 0≥≥ OWMP µµ , i.e. the 
                                                 
50 Adapted from Shy, Oz, The Economics of Networks Industries, Cambridge University Press, USA 2001, p. 23 et sequentia. 
51 I assume only that there is a Windows package with WMP – the complete – and without it – the incomplete one. 
52 “O” stands for “others”. 
53 “eq.” stands for “equation”. 
54 This cost is the one related with the creation of two separate versions of Windows available to consumers, as well as the (no-) installation 
time (resources) spent. 
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O
WMP
µ
µ≡)(qTC if producing the complete version 
if producing simple version (not with WMP) 
production of a complete version of Windows is costly. Altogether, considering the assumption that 
Microsoft can only either choose to produce one type of Windows version, but not the both types, implies 
that if the monopoly produces q units, its total production cost is given by    (eq. 5.2) 
   
  
  
 
 
I also assume that Microsoft makes decisions in a sequential manner divided into three stages. 
? Stage I (Design): when Windows is designed, Microsoft decides whether to make the software with 
WMP or without by deciding whether to install/bundle it with the final version, at an additional cost of 
OWMP µµ −  per package. 
? Stage II (Pricing): the Windows design is taken as given and Microsoft chooses a uniform price which 
I denote p. 
? Stage III (Consumers): each consumer/user decides whether to purchase one machine or not purchase 
at all. In making this decision, each consumer treats the total number of WMP users, q as given55. 
After consumers’ purchase decisions are done, Microsoft collects its revenue from them and profit is 
realized. 
I look for a Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium56 and I solve this game backward by solving stage III, then 
stage II, and lastly stage I. 
Stage III: Consumers’ purchase decisions 
Suppose first that the Windows software is produced with no WMP included. Then, eq. 5.2 
implies that the total number of buyers is (eq. 5.3) 
If β≤p  
If β>p  
 
 
Now, suppose that Microsoft bundles WMP in each Windows version, thereby making all 
versions complete. Then, eq. 5.2 implies that total number of buyers is (eq. 5.4) 
  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
55 Consumers have a perfect foresight and at the time of purchase they can correctly anticipate how many consumers will buy a complete 
Windows version. I rule out coordination failures and )0()0( =>> qUqU . 
56 An outcome is said to be a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the original game. 
Definition from Shy, OZ, The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge University Press, USA 2001, p.303. 
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Stage II: Microsoft selects a price 
In this stage, Microsoft selects a profit-maximizing price subject to consumers’ demand 
functions eq. 5.3 and eq. 5.4. If the version is complete, eq. 5.3 applies and Microsoft’s profit maximizing 
price is If β=p , yielding a profit of (eq. 5.5) ηµβπ 2)( WMPWMP −=  
If the version is simple (no WMP installed), eq. 5.4 applies and the profit of Microsoft as a function of 
price is (eq. 5.6) 
 
   
 
 
 
Stage I: Microsoft WMP inclusion decision 
In the first stage, Microsoft decides how to design its Windows version, knowing that bundling 
WMP would raise the production cost by OWMP µµµ −≡∆ . 
Comparing eq. 5.5 with the second part of eq. 5.6 reveals that the monopoly will never design 
the full complete version and charge only β=p , as there is no point in investing in WMP if consumers 
are not required to pay for it (note that this is not the actual real life situation). Hence, in making its 
decision, Microsoft need to compare eq. 5.5 with the first part of eq. 5.6. Therefore, Microsoft will 
produce complete versions if (eq. 5.7) 
ηµβηµαηβ 2)()( OWMP −≥−+  
Equation 5.7 reveals that an increase in the network externality parameter α will increase the 
parameter range where Microsoft will choose to design a full complete version of Windows. Finally, eq. 
5.7 can be simplified to (eq. 5.8) OWMP µβαηµ 2+−≤  
which has the interpretation that a complete version is profitable if the cost of making one version with 
WMP does not exceed the gain in revenue by increasing the price for consumers seeking WMP packages, 
αη , minus the loss from giving up on the other consumers, β  plus the “saving” made by not producing 
twice as many simple Windows versions. 
Now I should ask if there is any market failure. A natural question to ask at this point is whether 
a Microsoft monopoly reduces social welfare by over- or under-provision of full complete Windows 
versions. I define society’s social welfare as the summing up of consumers’ utilities and Microsoft’s 
profit. Suppose that the “Social Planner” decides on making single versions. Then the social welfare is 
given by (eq. 5.9) 
)(2)(2)()( OOOWMPO pppUUW µβηµηβηβηπηη −=−+−+−=++=  
Now suppose that the “Social Planner” decides on making full complete Windows versions, and 
selling them to all consumers! Then, the social welfare is given by (eq. 5.10) 
If αηβ +=p  
If β=p  ηµβ
ηµαηβ
2)(
)(
O
O
−
−+=Oπ
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[ ] )(2)(2)()( WMPWMPOWMPWMP pppUUW µαηβηµηβηηηαβηπηη −+=−+−+−++=++=
 Comparing eq. 5.9 with eq. 5.10 yields that full complete versions is socially preferred if (eq. 
5.11) 
OWMP µαηµ +≤  
The conditions given in eq. 5.8. and 5.11 are drawn in Figure 20, which divides the OWMP µµ −  
space in three regions: in region I, the unit cost of producing full complete versions is very high 
comparing to single Windows versions, hence both the social planner and Microsoft will choose single 
versions. Region III reflects the exact opposite extreme, and, in contrast, region II illustrates a parameter 
range where a market failure occurs since the monopoly will produce single versions, but full complete 
versions is socially optimal. The reason for that is because Microsoft is unable to price discriminate 
between the two groups of consumers.  
 Summing up, the first region is not what we observe in reality; the third one is the actual 
situation; and finally the second one illustrates the possible long-run market failure case if the 
“Regulatory Agency” oblige Microsoft to sell to different Windows packages and consumers don’t desire 
that to happen. So everything is in the hands of demand and consumer’s preferences and regulatory 
agencies should simply follow those trends and not regulate simple because it should be done. There are a 
lot of pros and cons to evaluate in terms of societal welfare. Note that the model presented could have 
been formulated so that other conclusion could have emerged as the efficient one. In order to have 
different conclusions and possible solutions to the so called “Microsoft Monopoly” just play with the 
parameters and see the consequences in terms of the model. 
 
5.6.1 Software pricing and Market Segmentation57 
 Price discrimination according to quality is common in the software industry. The most widely 
used quality differentiation involves removal of key features from the program and selling the reduced 
(simple) version to consumers with low-willingness to pay. 
Let θ  )1( >θ denote the exogenously-given number of extra features (in this case just the WMP) 
embedded in Windows. There are two types of consumers, those who are Media Friendly (hereafter just 
M) and use WMP to play audio, video, etc files, and those who are Light Users (hereafter L) of Windows 
and just use its basic office tools, without the fancy extra features. I assume that there are η  M type with 
a utility function given by (eq. 5.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Based on Shy, Oz, The Economics of Networks Industries, Cambridge University Press, USA 2001, p. 70 et sequentia. 
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If buys Windows with or without WMP 
If does not buy Windows 
If ηθ )1( +=p  
If η2=p  
If ηθ )1( +=p  
If η2=p  
In addition there are η  L type users whose utility function is given by (eq. 5.13) 
 
 
 
Assume that the full version (actual Windows package sold in stores) has already been 
developed so all development costs are considered as sunk. Assume that the software duplication and 
distribution of each copy is zero (i.e. zero marginal cost). However, let rφ  be the cost of developing a 
reduced version of Windows without WMP embedded.  
Suppose that only the complete version is offered for sale at a price denoted by p. facing the 
types of consumers, the profit maximizing prices to consider are either a low prices, η2=lp , in which 
both types of consumers purchase the Windows complete version; or setting a high price, ηθ )1( +=hp , in 
which only M type users buy.  Hence, eq. 5.12 and 5.13 imply that the number of Windows buyers and 
corresponding profit levels as functions of these prices are (eq. 5.15) 
 
=q    η
η
2     and  =π    2
2
4
)1(
η
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 When only the complete version is sold, Microsoft will charge a high price, ηθ )1( +== hpp if 
3>θ , in which case only M type users buy this version; and a low price η2== hpp , if 3≤θ , in which 
case the entire market is served. 
Now suppose that Microsoft sinks rφ  into creating a reduced version of Windows that does not 
include WMP. Let rp denote the price of the reduced version and p the price of the complete version. 
Clearly if 
rpp > , L type users will not purchase the complete version since WMP do not enhance their 
utility. Hence, if Microsoft wants to sell both versions, prices must be set so that (eq. 5.16) 
ηθηηθφ 2;22)1( ≤−→→−≥−+ rr pporpp  
meaning that prices should be set so that the utility of a M type user when buying the complete version 
exceeds the utility from buying the reduced version despite the fact the price of the reduced version is 
lower. 
 The method of finding the profit maximizing prices satisfying the condition given in eq. 5.16 is 
to set the lower price equal to the L type users’ reservation price, and then add ηθ2  which is the extra 
amount M type users are willing to pay for the extra features. Thus, η2=rp  and )1(2 θη +=p , yielding 
a profit level of (eq. 5.17) 
rrrpp φηφηφηηπ −++=−+= 22 2)1(2  
If θηφ 22<r  Microsoft makes a higher profit by selling two versions of software and by selling the 
version that is more costly to develop at a lower price. 
0
pq −≡LU
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 Ultima ratio, once again different results could have been obtained simply by playing with the 
parameters of the model above, but the main conclusion is that “it depends” whether it is more profitable 
for Microsoft to sell two versions as the Commission imposed or just sell one. In any case, Microsoft’s 
profit is just one side of the overall welfare, implying that one also should look to consumer’s surplus in 
the above analysis. I did not do that because this was just to show a sample of what economic models can 
do in explaining real life situations. From here everything is possible… 
As a final remark, in this Microsoft saga, regulatory agencies may some day conclude that the 
costs of constant regulatory battles—legal costs, fines, bad publicity, and bad relationships with 
governments—exceed the benefits of its Windows monopoly.  
 
6. Conclusion 
A global world with a single marketplace brings also global innovation and greater sources of 
ideas and inventions58. Being first had long implied advantages over later entrants (e.g. Microsoft) but is 
not longer a guarantee for necessary research must be maintained to stay ahead of competitors.  
Monopoly tends to have different effects to owners vis-à-vis consumers. Common wisdom 
among economists further suggests that the negative impact on consumers tends to dominate relative to 
the positive profit effects associated with monopoly. This divergence explains, in a word, why 
governments employ antitrust policies. However, technological progress, network externalities and 
international competition all represent disturbances relative to the common wisdom outlined above. With 
the innovation intense competition typical for the information economy, innovation is increasingly driven 
by companies that gain temporary monopoly power, but enjoy it only for a short time before being 
replaced by a firm with a better product. Hence, information economy may feature more monopolies than 
the traditional sectors of the economy, but that these monopolies may harm consumers only for a limited 
period of time. Indeed, if these market dynamics encourage innovation, consumers might actually benefit 
from the dynamic efficiency generated by high market concentration. Analogously, the presence of 
network externalities offers additional strategic instruments whereby incumbent firms might be able to 
abuse dominant market positions.  
With this paper I have tried to picture an overview of the actual and valid EU Competition 
Regulation and also a flavor of the future developments that will take place concerning the 
Internationalization of Antitrust Policy. This, indeed, is an issue of current big debate and countries and 
organizations are actually coordinating efforts by performing bilateral and multilateral agreements59, so 
that in the future we have an uniformly applicable antitrust system. Furthermore, I have demonstrated, by 
analyzing two past but recent EU cases (Volvo–Scania and Microsoft–WMP) that consumers are the sine 
qua non point of antitrust regulation and that depending which type of industry we are looking at, the 
consequences and solutions can vary, namely in the “New Economy” of information and digital goods. 
                                                 
58 See Bergel, Inga, Effects of globalization on antitrust policy, November 4th, 1997. 
59 See International antitrust co-operation: Bilateralism or Multilateralism?, Comments of K. von Finckenstein QC, Commissioner of 
Competition, to the ABA section of Antitrust Laws / CBA National Competition Law Section Conference International antitrust Issues: Pacific 
Rim and Beyond (Vancouver, 31 May 2001). 
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The economic model presented was a way to show how all these things can interact together as well as a 
sample of what can be done. 
The most important areas in EU Competition Policy (Mergers and Abuse of Dominant Position) 
have a lot of points in common and a decentralized application system of the EC antitrust rules could led 
to uncertainties in the interpretation of law and this will bear the danger that decision-making bodies 
might decide similar cases in dissimilar ways60 - therefore the need for international cooperation. Rony 
Gerrits, an associate at Morrison & Foerster LLP in Brussels, said once: “Antitrust is about economics, 
not about the question of whether or not your agreement contains a certain clause.”  The picture that 
emerges […] [concerning competition policy] in the enlarged EU is one of astonishing diversity and total 
underdevelopment.” 
Ultima ratio, antitrust law is, per definitionem, the study of competition and it is centred on 
certain principles; the primary one is that society is better off if markets behave competitively.  However 
that is no longer true if we look to computer related industries; the former antitrust regulation as we know 
it, will have to change and continuously follow and adapt to this “New Economy” - from onwards one 
should have ex-ante and ex-post “New Economy” Competition Policy. 
                                                 
60 See Goldsmith, P.I.B., Lanz C., Maybe Definitely – Definitely Maybe? EC Competition Law – Is the time ripe for Freform?, Eipascope, 
2/2001, p. 17 
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7. Appendix 
Figure 1: Figures below present number of new antitrust cases opened in years 1993-2002. 
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Source: Statistical data come from XXVIII and XXXII Reports on Competition Policy 
Figure 2: Number of decisions on Mergers & Acquisitions taken by the Commission 
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Source: Economist, 1999, Renner, 2000; UNCTAD, 2001 
  - Page 22 - 
Figure 3:  Powers under the EU Merger Control Regulation 
 
Source: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/tew/academic/strateg/Students/Syllabi/D145%20M&A%202.PPT 
Figure 4: Product line and geographical spread of the European commercial vehicles manufactures 
 
Figure 5: Increased concentration in European heavy trucks industry 
 
Source: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/tew/academic/strateg/Students/Syllabi/D145%20M&A%202.PPT 
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Figure 6: Rigid Trucks and tractor trucks 
 
Source: idei.fr/doc/by/ivaldi/iv_merger_v04.pdf  
Figure 7: Market shares per country in 1998 
Market Shares per country in 1998 
  Daf Daimler Iveco Man Renault Scania Volvo 
AU 5 18 6 3-4 4 16 12 
BE 17 18 6 11 8 17 23 
FI 4 18 7 10 3 30 29 
DK 0 10 4 3 18 31 34 
FR 8 16 8 5 38 9 14 
GE 5 42 6 26 2 9 8 
GR 3 36 2 12 3 17 24 
IR 13 9 8 6 3 27 22 
IT 4 16 41 6 9 12 12 
LU 15 28 8 14 10 15 11 
NE 33 12 3 9 3 23 16 
NO 4 9 2 12 1 32 38 
PO 14 12 7 6 17 19 25 
SP 9 19 20 8 19 16 13 
SW 2 6 0 0 1 46 45 
UK 18 9 9 7 6 19 18 
EEA 11 21 11 13 12 16 15 
Source: Commission Decision, based on the Notifications  
Market shares Trucks 10-15.9T GVW  Western Europe (1999) 
Daimler
30%
Iveco
22%
MAN
15%
RVI
14%
Volvo
9%
DAF
6%
Others
4%
 
Market shares trucks >16T GVW  Western Europe (1999) 
Daimler
20%
Volvo
15%
Scania
15%
MAN
14%
RVI
12%
Iveco
11%
DAF
10%
Others
3%
 
Source: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/tew/academic/strateg/Students/Syllabi/D145%20M&A%202.PPT 
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Figure 8: Market Share Variation in 1998: 
  Volvo Scania Daimler MAN RVI Iveco DAF 
EEA average 15,2 15,6 20,5 12,6 11,9 10,6 10,5 
Sweden 45 46 6 0 1 0 2 
Finland 34 31 10 3 18 4 0 
Denmark 29 30 18 10 3 7 4 
UK 18 19 9 7 6 9 18 
Ireland 22 27 9 6 3 8 13 
Germany 8 9 42 26 2 6 5 
Austria 12 16 18 34 4 6 9 
France 14 9 16 5 38 8 8 
Belgium 23 17 18 11 8 6 17 
Luxembourg 11 15 28 14 10 8 15 
Netherlands 16 23 12 9 3 3 33 
Italy 12 12 16 6 9 41 4 
Spain 13 16 19 8 19 20 9 
Portugal 25 19 12 6 17 7 14 
Greece 24 17 36 12 3 2 3 
Norway 38 32 9 12 1 2 4 
Source: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/tew/academic/strateg/Students/Syllabi/D145%20M&A%202.PPT 
Figure 9: Price Elasticity of total market demand 
Potential market factor 
  r=0,5 r=3,0 
Austria -0,49 -1,53 
Belgium -0,49 -1,11 
Denmark -0,47 -1,02 
Finland -0,38 -0,098 
France -0,44 -1,17 
Germany -0,53 -1,52 
Greece -0,28 -0,63 
Ireland -0,34 -10,5 
Italy -0,61 -1,63 
Luxembourg -0,41 -0,94 
Netherlands -0,59 -1,54 
Norway -0,56 -1,14 
Portugal -0,46 -1,21 
Spain -0,44 -1,22 
Sweden -0,44 -0,96 
UK -0,56 -1,27 
 
Note: the price elasticity of total market demand in this differentiated product model is defined as the percentage change in total demand 
for trucks when the prices of all trucks increase by one percent. 
 
Source: idei.fr/doc/by/ivaldi/iv_merger_v04.pdf  
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Figure 10: Efficiency defence 
#Economies of scale 
 
T a b le  1  -  M in im u m  a n n u a l v o lu m es  fo r o p tim a l p ro d u c tio n
C a b in s 2 0 0 0 0 0 +
F ra m e   4 0 0 0 0 +
A xles   4 0 0 0 0 +
E n g in es 2 0 0 0 0 0 +
F in a l a ssem b ly 1 0 0 0 0 0 +
S o u rc e : E s tim a tes  fro m  M u lle r an d  O w en , 1 9 8 1  
 
#R&D 
Table 1 - Financial requirem ents for the construction of a com m ercial vehicle - 1982,
£m
D esign and development costs:
com plete new  truck 120-200
truck w ith existing com ponents 50
new cabin 60
new axles 80
new engine 150-200
new  gearbox 50-200
Assembly unit cost 150-300
Sub-assembly unit costs 150
Research and design department 40
C om pany investm ent for a new  series of
comm ercial vehicles(using existing components)
350
Source: Estim ates from  M uller and O wen, 1981  
 
Figure 11: Percent price changes after merger 
Volvo/Scania Competitors 
  Rigid Tractor Rigid Tractor 
Austria 1,69 2,15 0,05 0,08 
Belgium 6,75 5,41 0,14 0,16 
Denmark 11,55 8,17 0,26 0,19 
Finland 10,03 7,83 0,39 0,24 
France 2,97 2,97 0,09 0,08 
Germany 1,65 2,19 0,04 0,06 
Greece 4,98 5,39 0,25 0,26 
Ireland 10,87 7,36 0,21 0,3 
Italy 2,02 1,49 0,07 0,07 
Luxembourg 3,33 1,65 0,05 0,05 
Netherlands 3,56 3,47 0,21 0,16 
Norway 13,17 8,63 0,32 0,28 
Portugal 6,67 5,06 0,19 0,12 
Spain 3,65 2,98 0,06 0,08 
Sweden 22,34 12,64 0,47 0,32 
UK 7,15 4,79 0,27 0,12 
Source: idei.fr/doc/by/ivaldi/iv_merger_v04.pdf  
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Figure 12: Thresholds - overview 
 
Source: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/tew/academic/strateg/Students/Syllabi/D145%20M&A%202.PPT 
Figure 13: Welfare analysis of the merger 
Premerger Change Premerger Change in Premerger Change in 
consumer  in consumer industry industry total total 
  surplus surplus (%) profit (%) profit (%) welfare welfare (%) 
Austria 100 -1,09 65,8 0,77 165,8 -0,35 
Belgium 97,8 -3,05 63,9 1,73 161,6 -1,16 
Denmark 97,4 -6,02 65,6 2,78 163 -2,48 
Finland 98,6 -8,44 67,9 3,65 166,6 -3,51 
France 98,9 -1,04 65,7 0,71 164,6 -0,34 
Germany 99,5 -0,62 67,9 0,45 167,4 -0,19 
Greece 97,7 -3,46 68,3 1,8 166 -1,3 
Ireland 99,9 -7 66,6 3,33 166,5 -2,87 
Italy 99 -1,03 66,9 0,71 165,9 -0,33 
Luxembourg 97,8 -0,59 68,4 0,38 166,2 -0,19 
Netherlands 98,8 -2,85 67,1 0,168 165,9 -1,02 
Norway 96,9 -10,71 69 3,78 165,8 -4,68 
Portugal 98,9 -3,34 64,1 1,92 163 -1,27 
Spain 99,2 -1,39 63,7 0,94 162,9 -0,48 
Sweden 97,4 -17,77 73,2 4,89 170,5 -8,05 
UK 97,8 -3,77 64,5 2,05 162,3 -1,46 
Source: idei.fr/doc/by/ivaldi/iv_merger_v04.pdf  
Figure 14: Welfare analysis in the presence of cost efficiencies 
Change in consumer surplus Change in total welfare 
cost effeciency of cost effeciency of 
  0% 5% 10% 0% 5% 10% 
Austria -10,9 0,02 1,19 -0,35 0,01 0,44 
Belgium -3,05 -1,41 0,31 -1,16 -0,56 0,14 
Denmark -6,02 -4,25 -2,42 -2,48 -1,79 -1,03 
Finland -8,44 -6,93 -5,37 -3,51 -2,93 -2,29 
France -1,04 0,1 1,29 -0,34 0,04 0,48 
Germany -0,62 0,24 1,15 -0,19 0,08 0,39 
Greece -3,46 -2,06 -0,6 -1,3 -0,8 -0,24 
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Ireland -7 -5,15 -3,24 -2,87 -2,16 -1,38 
Italy -1,03 -0,02 1,04 -0,33 0 0,38 
Luxembourg -0,59 0,24 1,11 -0,19 0,08 0,39 
Netherlands -2,85 -1,3 0,32 -1,02 -0,48 0,14 
Norway -10,71 -8,95 -7,14 -4,68 -3,96 -3,19 
Portugal -3,34 -1,78 -0,15 -1,27 -0,7 -0,05 
Spain -1,39 -0,2 1,06 -0,48 -0,07 0,41 
Sweden -17,77 -15,89 -13,95 -8,05 -7,23 -6,38 
UK -3,77 -2,13 -0,41 -1,46 -0,85 -0,15 
Source: idei.fr/doc/by/ivaldi/iv_merger_v04.pdf  
 
Figure 15: Microsoft Market Share 
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Source: http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Enseignement/CoursEcoIndus/SupportsdeCours/ECvsMC.pdf 
 
Figure 16: Average number of monthly users 
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Source: http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Enseignement/CoursEcoIndus/SupportsdeCours/ECvsMC.pdf 
 
Figure 17: The Monopoly Problem 
The monopoly problem is straightforward. The firm in the graph below is assumed to have monopoly 
market power and can restrict output and raise price only because it does not face competition. To 
maximize its profit, the firm operates at the output level when its marginal cost is equal to marginal 
revenue (Qm). At that output level, market price is determined by the demand (Pm), which is greater than 
marginal cost (MC). The firm's profit is (Pm - MC) Qm > 0. At Qm level of production, consumers' 
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willingness to pay, Pm, is greater than the cost of producing the product (MC). Thus society will be better 
off if more resources are allocated into this industry leading to a greater output level at Qc and lower price 
Pc.  
 
 
 Figure 18: Economies of Scale 
 
Figure 19: Network Externality and Output 
In the graph below, two lines represent the level of consumer benefits or willingness to pay (WTP) with 
respect to the number of total users. The lower line shows the average willingness to pay without 
externality. It shifts upward when we consider externality (with more benefits as the number of users 
increases). The optimal number of product is Q1 at P1 if the firm can charge the benefit from network 
externality. If not, the output is reduced to Q2 with a lower price P2. At P2, the marginal cost is below the 
true consumers' willingness to pay, implying that the product is underproduced.  
 
  - Page 29 - 
 
If the firm can operate at (Q1, P1), the market does not have an externality problem. On the other hand, if 
the firm is forced to operate at (Q2, P2), the market is characterized by a network externality. 
 
Figure 20: Possible market failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oz, Shy, The Economics of Network Industries, p.26 
OWMP µµ =  
Oµ
WMPµ
I. 
II. 
III. 
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